the unlamented end of pan-Arabism

Last week Tony Badran of Across the Bay posted a most enlightening essay: The Irrelevance of Political Arabism. He defines that movement as follows.

[W]hat exactly is political Arabism? There are two essential elements: 1- Pan-Arab unity, and 2- the centrality of the Palestinian cause, which in other terms means “anti-Israel” ideology.

He notes that Arab regimes habitually play these two cards in times of crisis, as did Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a speech to his nation on 6 March. But Assad's appeal had little pull outside Syria.

Arabist rhetoric is used for local politics, and is redefined by local politics. Bashar's and [Hezbollah secretary-general] Nasrallah's attempt to use it for regional politics is hitting a wall. And their attempt to use it as a tool to smear and intimidate opponents will only weaken it further. Beyond that, it's become totally irrelevant as a political ideology. And thank God for that. Now we may have a chance to actually move forward and solve our internal problems (what Bashar is trying to delay as much as possible with none other than Arabist rhetoric), each on our own.

Badran contends that Hezbollah's attempt at following the Syrian lead was even less successful—the vehement anti-Israel rhetoric was of course not new, but the recently-adopted appeal to Arab nationalism still strikes many as strange, considering the messenger.

The attempt by Bashar to return this into the anti-Israel prism hit a stone wall everywhere except with Hizbullah. The reason is obvious, but it has nothing to do with the adoption of political Arabism. Fighting Israel is Hizbullah's raison d'être and source of prestige, and foremost, the reason why it gets to keep its arsenal. […]

This is not to say that Hizbullah doesn't believe this rhetoric (I'm sure they do), but there's a lot going on underneath it. First of all, Hizbullah only recently shifted to the Arabist rhetoric. All along it held the Islamist line. It morphed the two into a “pan-Arabist Islamic” line when it needed to. It did so for various reasons: 1- the Islamist agenda in Lebanon had no hope. The country is too diverse and too liberal to ever accept it. 2- the corollary to that is that Hizbullah is a Shiite group, with a Khomeinist agenda. That's two strikes against you! Islamist groups are bad enough, but a Shiite Islamist group? That will never fly. Too many Sunnis around to prevent it.

That's why Hizbullah needed to modify the rhetoric in order to achieve regional (i.e. Sunni Arab) acceptance and relevance. It succeeded during the late 90's and in 2000 when the Israelis finally withdrew. That was the peak of Hizbullah's success. It has been downhill ever since.

There's more: The Shi'ites of Iraq saw their fortunes change most dramatically as a result of Gulf War II. That—along with the stinging defeat of Muqtada al-Sadr's militia last year—has made incitement of Arab Shi'ites a tall order indeed.

If political Arabism is going the way of so many other twentieth-century ideologies, what will take its place? Badran suggests a “me first”-ism, as national identities take on greater significance. Yet this does not mean nationalism with a chip on its shoulder, but rather the forging of an internal consensus. In Lebanon, that means looking ahead to a restoration of self-governance. The Cedar Revolution has already reconciled Maronites, Druze, and Sunni—something unimagined only weeks ago. Only Hezbollah remains on the outs, and that by its own choice.

Iraq provides another stunning example of this phenomenon. Opponents of the war often charged that democracy cannot be imposed, that it must instead be chosen. In this, if in few other of their complaints, the critics had a point: so long as the Iraqi populace remained passive, Coalition efforts at building a civil society were to large degree fruitless. Here again, the impact of the January elections cannot be overstated. It gave the Iraqi people their own narrative—a fresh start, something they achieved with eight million votes. And despite internal divisions, the signs of a national consensus are unmistakable: whether it be a decided optimism for the future, or the unequivocal rejection of al Qaeda's butchery in the name of Islam.

Things could still go very wrong. But I am increasingly optimistic about Iraq, and with Wretchard of The Belmont Club see reason to hope that the insurgency there is on its last legs. The news from Lebanon will likely get worse before it gets better. But God willing, the Beirut spring will not fail of its promise.

If Iraq and Lebanon become models for the region, the decline of pan-Arabism will accelerate, and with it the diseased obsession with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Which, in the end, would provide the Palestinians with the best incentive to negotiate in good faith since last fall's passing of their treacherous, thieving, genocidal death-cultist of a president-for-life.

Anthony,

I agree with your post and am probably more convinced that pan-Arabism will inevitably crumble. I may be taking a leap here, but my thoughts on this subject have been trying to anticipate what the next phase will look like. The scariest result of this crumbling is one where the Islamists and Fascists unite, like in Iraq, to wage a Middle East-wide, civil war against the pro-democracy, moderate Muslims. Let me just throw the following, mostly unsupported thoughts out there:

This likelihood of this scenario will mostly come down to logistics: the Islamists and Fascists will need a stronghold (ala Fallujah) from which they can supply, launch and coordinate their attacks. If this occurs on a regional scale, they will need a state, and not just a city, to do this. At this point, the two best candidates for a base of operations are Iran (most likely), Saudi Arabia (less likely) and Syria (even less likely). Syria is too weak at this point, and being surrounded by hostile countries, most notably one filled with some U.S.-supported, vengeful Iraqis, their regime would end rather quickly. The Saudi Arabian regime is too duplicitous—just as in Texas Hold’em, a civil war of this nature would force the supporting country to “go all in.” The Saudis don’t have that commitment even though they’ve been crapping on their front door step by supporting al-Qaeda for years.

Iran is a different story, especially if they obtain nuclear weapons. If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, Iran can seal its borders and threaten nuclear retaliation against any invasion. This would require the United States to put free, non-nuclear allies under its nuclear umbrella (Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Turkey and hopefully Lebanon). Being that the pro-democracy forces will be under-prepared during this stage, the main military lifting will be done by the United States, supported by Australia and probably Britain.

I believe the pro-democracy, moderate Muslims, with support from the U.S. led-Coalition, would ultimately prevail, however, will a few cities in the region go up in a fireball before it’s over (most likely ones holding a large number of U.S. troops)?

Just like Michael Leeden, I am convinced that ultimate nightmare situation will come to fruition if Iran obtains nukes. Is there any scenario where the U.S. could actually pre-empt with nukes? If this happens, just imagine the screaming that would ensue from the American and Euro leftists. Do we allow millions to die to avoid a political collapse at home?

Anyway, these are just some random, disjointed thoughts. I’d like to develop this further and wonder where your thinking is taking you.

In the midst of all this upheaval comes the moribund Arab League conference, which ignores everything impt & is sticking to the "It's Israel's fault" script. I hate reruns

By the way, that would be three, not two potential bases of operations.

With those math skills, you'd think I worked in finance or something...;-)