a Hezbollah primer

Reader Tom Bombadil sent along this essay on the self-proclaimed Party of God and its influence in and around Lebanon. As I've been meaning to write more on the subject, Master Bombadil's essay will serve as a useful introduction.

Party to Terror or Party Politics?

I wanted to add a couple of angles to the Lebanese situation and the role of Hezbollah in the process.

First some background on the history of Hezbollah:

Hezbollah is an Iranian founded and controlled Shiite group that is permitted by Syria to operate within Lebanon. It is important to remember that the divisions seen in Iraq between the Shias and Sunnis reverberate in the Lebanese/Syrian relationship as well. Syria is governed by President Assad—a Sunni Baathist—while Hezbollah takes the prize for most ideologically devoted terrorist group. It is considered the purest representative of “Khatt al-Imam” (the line of the Imam, in Arabic) a lofty accolade in the Islamic world.

[APM comments: Many—most?—Sunni Muslims consider Shi'ism a heresy. If respect for Hezbollah's ideological fervor is widespread, the same cannot be claimed for the Party's theology or its regional ambitions. Also, while Bashar Assad is indeed a Ba'athist, he is not Sunni, but rather a member of Syria's Alawite minority, which comprises about 12 percent of that country's population.]

Hezbollah's capabilities are extensive and manifold. They are regarded as the best organized and trained terrorist militia in existence (outclassing al Qaeda even at the height of that organization's power and influence). Hezbollah's intelligence network is believed to run cells from Latin America to West and East Africa and throughout the Persian Gulf region. The Party of God is also thought to maintain active ties with al Qaeda in Europe, Iran, Pakistan and Chechnya. Still, in recent years—since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000—Hezbollah's capacity for large-scale operations seems to become at least somewhat atrophied.

While Hezbollah's prowess as a terror organization is universally recognized, it has nonetheless avoided being labelled as such by certain multilateral entities. The EU in particular has long resisted this move, led (once again) by the French, who have considerable business interests in Lebanon and who are acutely sensitive to the opinions of Hezbollah's supporters both inside and outside of that country. Yet this status quo may now be changing: just days ago the European Parliament urged the EU Council (via a non-binding resolution) to slap the terrorist label on the Party. Even the French position could conceivably change, as the recently murdered Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was both a close ally of the French and a personal friend of Jacques Chirac.

Some thoughts on the present:

Last week Hezbollah came to the fore in Lebanon, with a large demonstration ostensibly intended both to thank Syria and to challenge the Bush Administration. While at some level, I am sure that there is a measure of gratitude to the Syrians for bringing stability to Lebanon (albeit at the expense of the Druze and the Maronite Christian minorities), that appreciation only goes so far.

Two things strike me about last week's demonstration. First, it appears that, given the outward display of Lebanese nationalism, the Party is looking to be recognized as a legitimate political force. And second, despite these outward signs the West must realize that Hezbollah's ultimate goals have always been in lockstep with the designs of their spiritual masters in Teheran.

Thus far, it seems that the Iranians have accommodated the Syrian occupation of Lebanon because of the mullahs' need for a regional ally and because the Syrian military presents an ongoing distraction for Israel. Now that the sands are shifting, Iran will likely seek to retain (or expand) the role of Hezbollah as a counter to American interests. For Iran, then, whether the Syrians stay or go is no longer the principal concern. Despite announcing a strategic relationship with Syria just a few weeks ago, in truth the Iranians are only paying lip service to this alliance.

The level of integration between Hezbollah and the Iranian military and secret services cannot be overstated. Iranian Revolutionary Guards are replete within the command structure of both the Party's military and political wings, thus ensuring a high degree of operational control. Hezbollah has a vested interest in the well being of Lebanon but their concern would dissolve instantaneously if their masters ordered them to ramp up the violence against Israel or begin attacks on American targets. Hezbollah terror is a real option for Iranians, should they wish to send the Bush administration a message in response to pressure against (or attacks upon) the mullahs' nuclear program, or to fend off attempts to circumscribe Iranian interests in Iraq.

[APM comments: Well, that is the question, no? Certainly the Iranian presence in Lebanon should not be ignored, but the political pressure on Hezbollah should not be minimized, either. Open acts either against the US or against other Lebanese factions would, in the end, likely result in the Party's isolation from both Syrian and direct Iranian support. Certainly France's diplomatic shield would evaporate. And were Hezbollah to begin a civil war in Lebanon, they would lose, as the international community does not seem willing to tolerate another protracted conflict.]

To demonstrate this point the Iranians took the occasion of the murder of Rafik Hariri to signal the United States that it has more options in play than just the threat of nuclear weapons, inferring that Hezbollah stood ready to become a factor again.

Some thoughts on the future:

The Bush administration is taking a multi-track approach to the Lebanon crisis. The United States would clearly like Hezbollah eliminated as a terrorist group. Accordingly it has raised the level of rhetoric deliberately, attempting to create a linkage between Hezbollah and the withdrawal of the Syrians, by demanding that Hezbollah be disarmed as part of the Syrian withdrawal.

[APM: Security Council Resolution 1559 does indeed call for both withdrawal of foreign (read: Syrian) troops and disarmament of all armed Lebanese militias (read: Hezbollah, as that is the only such militia now in existence). So yes, the Bush administration is linking the two issues by pushing for enforcement of said Resolution. But as a pragmatic matter, the US would be quite happy to see Syrian pullout first, followed by increased pressure upon Hezbollah.]

The US would also very much like to see a weakened relationship between Hezbollah and Iran—a likely result, were the Party of God defanged and relegated to the status of just another political party. Recent reports suggest a new Administration willingness to accept such a transformation, were Hezbollah to completely renounce terrorist activity and commit to a verifiable disarmament of their militia. The Party is far indeed from accepting these conditions, but were they to do so, Iranian regional power would suffer a severe blow.

Some questions:

The Israelis seem to be concerned that if Syrian forces do leave Lebanon, Hezbollah stands ready to fill the military and political vacuum. This would hardly clear the way for pro-Western democrats. How will Israel respond if this is indeed the outcome? Given the bad blood between Lebanon and Israel after the long IDF occupation of the southern “security zone,” does Israel have any leverage with which to influence the outcome?

[APM: Short answer? No. Any overt Israeli action will strengthen the hand of Hezbollah, and weaken the ability of the US and our western allies to finesse a soft landing.]

Should Syria actually withdraw it would likely try to maintain control in Lebanon through covert means. They would attempt to employ their intelligence services to play the role formerly played by conventional military forces. Can they succeed in this?

[Almost certainly not.]

Sidebar:

Lebanon's Bekaa Valley is the heart of Syrian occupation. It is also a place that President Assad is known to personally profit from the growing of opium poppies. Retired Generals Thomas G. McInerney and Paul E. Vallely assert in their book (Endgame: The Blueprint for Victory in the War on Terror) that the Bekaa may also hold the key to Saddam Hussein's missing weapons of mass destruction. Syria has a WMD program of its own, with a number of suspected development sites including one in southern Syria, near the Lebanese border, in a city called Sjinsjam, itself near the city of Homs. I raise this issue because there are a number of tertiary Syrian interests that must be factored into American expectations of a full withdrawal.

Thanks for reading,

Tom Bombadil

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