Russia and Ukraine, II

Several days back, reader TomBombadil posted a few questions which led to an unplanned Russia Week here at andúnië.net. I all but exhausted my knowledge of the subject here. Master Bombadil then followed up with a veritable essay of his own posted in the comments, which I reproduce here with his permssion.

His take is rather more pessimistic than my own, and is well worth the read.

MORE. As is this from TF6S.
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[…] I would like to take the opportunity afforded by this venue to put some more color to my concerns and then take a crack at answering my own questions.

I agree with your assertion that Putin’s future is secure (for the moment) even though the Ukraine is not the only place where he has been forced to consume geopolitical crow of late; Russian geopolitical defeats in the past four years have come in at blistering pace. Moscow has racked up foreign policy losses in Central Asia, the Baltics, the Balkans and the Caucasus. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan all became U.S. allies. Serbia formally left Russia's sphere of influence (as you noted), Georgia welcomed U.S. troops with open arms and ejected a Russian-backed strongman from one of its separatist republics, and the three Baltic states and the bulk of the Warsaw Pact joined both NATO and the European Union. The fact is that Putin now lacks the political levers to reverse any of these events.

His efforts to get the Bush administration to label the Chechens as terrorists were successful, but this is pyrrhic victory: the cover it provided did little to improve the situation on the ground. Chechnya is still a blight on Putin’s credibility and may become a greater liability if the military situation changes. The Russians are in no better position today to end the stalemate militarily than they were at the outset of the conflict; 90,000 troops have been unable to pacify Chechnya even after five years of direct occupation.

Whether by intent or not, both the European Union and NATO have accelerated the deterioration of the Russian geopolitical situation. Each has expanded its borders steadily, and now stand by to welcome Ukraine with open arms while Russia's voice is unheard in the rush. While I agree with your point (made in answer to one of the questions) about the military viability of NATO apart from the United States, the present situation is nonetheless a constant reminder of the failures of realpolitik as practiced by the Russian state.

Aside: Patrick Belton at Oxblog has a long post on the issues surrounding NATO's non-US power projection limitations. The US wants the alliance to face problems outside of Europe, notably in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East. But it is largely locked in place, a hostage to Continental politics and a lack of means.

The basic problem of the alliance … is cash. While the US contributes 3.3% of its GDP to national defence, 12 of the 19 pre-2004 NATO allies contribute less than 2% of theirs. To look at it another way, the US picks up the tab for 64% of NATO military expenditures ($348.5 million, 2002), while all other allies together contribute only the remaining 36% ($196.0 million). For their part, European governments are facing budget shortfalls and budget pressure from ballooning pension costs.

What comes out of this is a capabilities gap. Of 1.4 million soldier under NATO arms in October 2003, allies other than the US contributed all of 55,000. Nearly all allies lack forces which can be projected away from the European theatre. SACEUR General James Jones testified before Congress in March 2004 that only 3-4% of European forces were deployable for expeditions.

This continuing series of setbacks to Russian prestige is taking its toll, and I believe that Putin will ultimately pay the price. I do like your statement that “Vladimir Putin is Russia,” and agree that he provides the Russians populists with façade of strong traditional leadership. But it is not the public that I am concerned with in the near future. Rather, I am convinced that the Russian military is close to a “tipping point” with respect to the worsening geopolitical and strategic posture of the state.

While I am not predicting a coup d'etat, I could easily see the Russian military demanding a stronger line from Putin, while beginning to work actively to undermine him. The effect would in the end be to put him in an antagonistic role with the West. Simultaneously they would covertly work against American interests—with or without Putin’s sanction—as they perceive the US as the symbol of Western power.

Now back to the Ukriane. I personally think that all of the aforementioned setbacks pale in comparison to the situation in Russia's ancestral home; the 10th- to 13th-century entity of Kievian Rus is widely considered as the birthplace of today's Russia. But Moscow's queasiness over losing Ukraine is far from just the anxiety of emotional attachment. Here are some facts to consider (courtesy my basic Stratfor membership).

• All but one of Russia's major infrastructure links to Europe pass through Ukraine.

• Three-quarters of Russia's natural gas exports pass through Soviet-era pipelines that cross Ukraine.

• In most years, Russia has imported food from Ukraine.

• Eastern Ukraine is geographically part of the Russian industrial heartland.

• The Dnieper River, the key transport route of Russia's Belarusian ally, flows south through Ukraine — not east Russia.

• With a population of just under 50 million, Ukraine is the only captive market in the Russian orbit worth that is worth the effort of reintegration.

• The Black Sea fleet — Russia's only true warm-water fleet — remains at Sevastopol on Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula, as that is the only deep-water port on the entire former Soviet Black Sea coast.

• A glance at a population density map indicates just how close Russia's population centers are to the Ukrainian border; and moreover how a hostile Ukraine would pinch off easy Russian access to the volatile North Caucasus, a region already rife with separatist tendencies.

• Moscow and Volgograd — Russia's two defiant icons of World War II — are both less than 300 miles from the Ukrainian border.

Taken together I believe that this represents a critical moment in Russian history. Without Ukraine, I believe that Russia is doomed to a painful slide into geopolitical obsolescence, and ultimately perhaps even nonexistence.

Here are my responses to the questions I posed earlier:

I not sure anyone has given much thought to the implication of a Ukraine in the Western rather then traditional Russian sphere of influence.

I agree with your response on this point, and perhaps my categorical statement about the lack of thinking on the matter was overstated. I do suspect that mainstream media outlets find the topic of the events in the Ukraine to be more of a feel-good story about the power of the proletariat then an opportunity for in-depth analyses of the Russian perspective.

Will the disintegration of the Soviet Union be followed by a disintegration of the Russian Federation if pro-Western factions prevail?

The Commonwealth of Independent States, the only international organization that Moscow can rely upon for support (and, incidentally, the only one it dominates) is moribund because of lack of interest. Its days are numbered, and talk of a Russian-led Eurasian Economic Community that would reform the regional economy remains largely just that. Even participation in the French dream of a “Multipolar Alliance” seems out of reach, as Russia has little to contribute.

[It is therefore likely that with the loss of Ukraine, Russia will turn inward.] In such case I do not agree with your assessment that “popular independence movements are not likely to arise unless and until the central government is considerably weakened.” Rather, I would make the point that Russia is largely a state formed by an expansionist military policy. The Karelian Isthmus of Russia's northwest once was Finnish territory, while the southern tier of the Russian Far East was once Chinese. Deep within the Russian “motherland” are the homelands of vibrant minorities such as the Tatars and the Bashkirs, who theoretically could survive on their own. Of course the North Caucasus is a region ripe for shattering; Chechens are not the only Muslims in the region with separatist desires.

Should the West be concerned with or give any accommodation to the Russian sphere of influence in surrounding countries as a component of its real or perceived security needs?

For me this is the hardest question, and one for which I cannot find an acceptable answer. As the reader has probably discerned by now, I am generally not an optimist on the matter of Russia. I do not believe that the West will have any meaningfully positive influence in the long run. Indeed, I am convinced that the West will have to re-adopt a model of containment towards an increasingly authoritarian and unfriendly Russia. I don’t think that we can offer anything beyond symbolic gestures that in the end will not satisfy Russian nationalist elements.

How will Russia react to their obsession for secure and defensible borders for Russia would find its first line of defense along nearly the lines of Nazi Germany’s deepest penetration into the country in World War II?

There is an assumption that Putin is eager to avoid a confrontation with the West. This is almost certainly true; as you stated, he threw his support to President Bush during the election by making a number of supporting comments. But I believe he expects to be repaid. If the Bush administration presses hard on Ukraine or has nothing to offer as a counterbalance (again I submit there is nothing to give), I suspect this will be the trigger of a fundamental re-evaluation by Russia of its international strategy.

I am convinced that if Putin is to make the West rethink its current approach and thus safeguard his own position, he will have to act in a way to persuade the West that Moscow has fight left in it still, and is far from out of options. They may be the options akin to a player with a losing poker hand, but they are options nonetheless. Some hypotheticals:

• Consider the situation in Iraq if the latest generation of Russian technology in anti-tank or light air defense weapons were made available to the insurgency. While they would not provide a long-term tactical advantage that American forces could not eventually overcome, the potential for greater lethality and an exponential increase in casualties would create a severe perturbation in the politics over Iraq.

• Or: perhaps Russian sales of long-range cruise missiles to India; or Sovremenny destroyers complete with Sunburn missiles to China, thus threatening U.S. control of the oceans; or weapons sales to Latin America, undermining U.S. influence in its own backyard. Or perhaps the occasional quiet message to North Korea in order to upset U.S. policy in the Koreas, or similar gambits intended to overstretch American military power, especially logistical components and the Army in particular.

The next question is: how might the U.S. respond to such provocation? The risks are not inconsequential. Putin undoubtedly understand that the American president rewards friends, and that Bush's test of friendship is straightforward: support for the United States, and in particular support for his policies being pursued in the war on terror. A decision by Putin to oppose the United States would be made with the assumption that Russia could absorb the cost, or that the end is near and the cost does not matter.

But to continue with the poker analogy, everyone at the table knows that the Russian with the funny glasses and a perpetually full glass of vodka is both halfway through his last cigarette and short stacked. The last hand is being played, and the last bet has been called. In Putin’s case he is looking at deuces, off suite, and the American is slow playing him with an inside straight. Game over.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but without Ukraine, are Russia's political, economic and military survivability called into question?

Because I believe that “Vladimir Putin is Russia” I must disagree with your assertion that we are not faced with a zero-sum game. On the contrary: I am convinced that we are seeing the beginnings of the end of Russia as we now it. It is an “earthquake society” (thanks again to Stratfor). It does not evolve. The pressures—social, political and economic—build up within the country until it suffers a massive tectonic shift, cataclysmic breakdown and then revival. The only question remaining is how long before the real earthquake begins.

A follow up to the post on Ukraine…

Economic trends are a principal precursor to geopolitical shifts, security tensions and then political change in a woeful summation of one of the key tenants of Thomas P.M. Barnett’s book “The Pentagon’s New Map”. Therefore I spend a lot of time in publications such as the Wall Street Journel, Financial Times, and The Economist looking for leading indicators for challenges within the security and political arena.

The linkage between global economic interdependence and the Russian situation make the announcement of Deutsche Telekom decision to sell its 12% stake in Russia’s Mobile Giant MTS significant. It is perhaps a precursor of an exodus of foreign capital out of Russia

President Putin has the issue of paying back taxes to control (and maybe ultimately eliminate) the Russian oligarchs one of which is Mobile TeleSystems. The intended effect of subordinating them and regaining control of nearly 70 percent of the country's economy is starting to present an interesting balancing act for Putin. On the surface this effort will require massive changes to the country's legal structure while not scaring about foreign investment. Foreign Russian investors who are typical risk averse have been very vocal about the means being used (they ultimately affect shareholder value and profitability) and the ultimate steps required to see it through. There is good reason for them to believe Putin’s anti-oligarchic efforts have just begun and that they not seen anything yet.

The reason that a divestment by the Germans is interesting is that the cellular market in Russia is a prime investment opportunity and that Germany has more reasons than any other country to remain economically involved in Russia, Deutsche Telecom's announcement bodes ill for foreign investment in Russia. If a German company is divesting itself of half its stock in a Russian cellular company, it is a signal that investors from other countries will likely begin pulling their money out of Russia. The end result will to undermine the economy, which happens to be recovering at the moment.

Another Russian business situation to observe is the bizarre plight of Russia's top oil exporter YUKOS being broken up and auctioned to pay off back taxes totaling $27.8 billion (and rising). YUKOS Chief Executive Stephen Theede acknowledged Monday that the $9.4 billion government sale of its Yuganskneftegaz operation was an "irreversible act".

""Russia is sliding toward being uninvestable. The whole thing is very sad," said Martin Taylor, hedge fund manager at London-based Thames River capital running $5.5 billion assets.

In the 1990s, Russian stocks traded at low valuations because everyone was worried about being robbed by the oligarchs. Now everyone is worried about being robbed by the government," Taylor told Reuters.

The tightrope walk has began for Putin four years ago. During that time he has only taken a couple few steps eliminate four oligarchs. Each step has gotten harder, requiring a high degree of finesse to maintain the balance. YUKOS is step five and the Mobile TeleSystems/Deutsche Telekom is another sign of that the foreigners are not going to wait for the fall.

A notable voice has offered another point of view to the assertions made in my previous post. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski who I hold in very high esteem (for all his work after his association with the Carter Administration) takes different view. In a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) panel on the Ukrainian election he made the following remarks:

In any case, any democratic Ukrainian government will have to have good relations with Russia. That is not an issue. The issue is not that a democratic   government in Ukraine takes Ukraine into NATO and makes it part of some sort of an anti-Russian bloc. That's not in the cards.

What is at stake is whether Ukraine moves towards democracy for which it appears increasingly ready on the social scale; and whether that in term accelerates the process of democratization in Russia. That is one of the reasons why Putin and his associates are so uncomfortable with the idea of a real democratic breakthrough in Ukraine.”

Dr. Brzenzinski believes that it is the external pressure of Ukrainian democracy that is the primary threat to Putin’s attempt to aims. He submits that Russians will be influenced be events there and demand a course diametrically opposed to Putin’s. With all due respect to him, I think that he is mistaken. While this maybe a factor to some segment of the Russian population, I am not sure that they have fond memories of their experience with it during Boris Yetsin’s tenure. In fact Celeste Wallander a CSIS Fellow who spoke on the same panel reinforces this point:

Anyone who visits Russia and then visits Ukraine as I had the occasion to do several times this year is struck by the difference in the vigor and optimism of civil society in Ukraine versus that in Russia. And this is not to blame Russians. I think that the Russian political system has been different for the last couple of years and has had a different focus than the Ukrainian political system. And while the Ukrainian political system was not open and democratic, there was a more vigorous sustained opposition, different elections were contested even though there was plenty of evidence of fraud, whereas the trends in Russia were much more closing down legitimate opposition and free media, and in particular civil society groups.

I believe that the only role that the democratic movements have at the moment is to stir the pot putting more pressure on the Russian President. Perhaps they could serve the role of scapegoat that Putin will ultimately look for when justifying further reductions in personal liberties, just the sort of paradox that only former KGB apparatchik could fully appreciate.

Dr. Brzenzinski entertains some questions before he is scheduled to leave the panel early. Most of them are unremarkable with the exception of this one:

According to the transcript, DmitriCedar of Commerce and Russian Daily asks a question that alludes to the possibility of Russian troops entering the Ukraine during the crisis. The question was in part inaudible to the transcription service but is the answer is fascinating.

Question: And even [inaudible] as far as my newspaper had reported yesterday, sending troops to Ukraine.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: That's been not confirmed but there have been two eye witness reports to that effect. The one from Juliette Mashenka and the other one from a colonel whose name I don't remember but it was the officer of the airport who refused to clear the two transports for landing. But we don't know for sure whether these were Russian Spetznaz forces or not?

What? Russian Special Forces troops may have been trying land in the Ukraine in the middle of its electoral crisis? Forgive my sarcasm, but where did Putin go for advice to take this option? Some please check to see if President Putin itinerary in the days prior included the grave sites of Lenin, Stalin or Brezhnev. I jest of course. I do find it fascinating (if this turns out to be true) that someone would offer it to him as a course of action. I suggest it would be the kind of advice he could count from the General Staff of the Russian Military.

Finally, I guess this news is subjective enough that is has not been discussed in the MSM. I find it a huge revelation about Putin’s willingness to use meaning other then normal diplomacy to influence events. I believe it further reinforces my perspective.

Thanks for prominently posting my initial perspective on the Ukraine your blog. And thanks for enduring my follow up. My interests are not exclusively Russian studies anymore and I hope to contribute to other topics in the future (especially Tolkien related).

Sincerely,

TomBombadil

Who is Tom Bombadil? An essay by Eugene Hargrove