Russia and Ukraine

The shameless 80s nostalgia in my post on Poland's Solidarity movement prompted substantive questions from reader TomBombadil.

I am interested in your opinions on the Ukrainian situation. I am not sure that most American’s appreciate the political gravity of the situation from the Russian perspective. I not sure anyone has given must thought to the implication of a Ukraine in the Western rather then traditional Russian sphere of influence.

In order to understand the excitement and to go beyond the idea that this is simply about helping democracy grow in Ukraine. It is my opinion that the United Stated needs to consider the geopolitical implications if the pro-Western factions prevail in a new election. I would ask you to consider the geopolitical condition of the former Soviet Union (I use the old title as point of emphasis). Here are my questions:

Will the disintegration of the Soviet Union be followed by a disintegration of the Russian Federation if pro-Western factions prevail?

Should the West be concerned with or give any accommodation to the Russian sphere of influence in surrounding countries as a component of it’s real or perceived security needs?

How will Russia react to their obsession for secure and defensible borders for Russia would find its first line of defense along nearly the lines of Nazi's Germany’s deepest penetration into the country in World War II?

Not to put too fine a point on it, but without Ukraine, are Russia's political, economic and military survivability are called into question?

For a truly informed opinion on Russia you'd be better off asking the incoming SecState. But as she's otherwise occupied, I will do my amateur best.

It's safe to assume that now, and for the forseeable future, Vladimir Putin is Russia. He remains wildly popular at home—even after a string of terror attacks that, had they occurred here, might well have gotten the Bush Administration voted out for incompetence. So the best indications of where Russia is headed come from her rather inscrutable President.

For most of the past four years relations between Washington and Moscow have been warm. This, in spite of NATO enlargement into the former Warsaw Pact nations; US military presence in the Central Asian *stans, which once were Soviet republics; and vehement disagreement over Gulf War II. At the Sea Island G8 summit this past June, Putin gave what, in diplo-speak, seemed suspiciously like an endorsement of President Bush's reelection.

But those halcyon days might be over. The Russian president was clearly angered by the Western response to his consolidation of power in the wake of the Beslan massacre, and even hinted darkly about possible complicity of unnamed foreign powers in that attack. Last week he went further in accusing the US of running a dictatorship over world affairs—apparently an echo, albeit in stronger language, of the characteristic French grousing over American hegemony.

Moreover, it is increasingly clear that Putin is more authoritarian than democrat. Yet from without, it is impossible to ascertain his long-term goals: Does he see a strong centralized government as a temporary necessity, in order to steer the country away from rule by the powerful interests (criminal and otherwise) which rose from the ruins of the Soviet system? Or does he view democracy within strict limits as the Russian way? Or—worse—is he interested in power for its own sake? (I find the last option unlikely, but it would be premature indeed to rule it out of bounds.)

Russia will never again be a superpower. But it will be generations before any Russian leader will allow his country to seen as less than a great power, which means that Putin and his successors will do what is necessary to maintain regional influence in Eurasia and Central Asia, and especially in the Near Abroad, those nations once part of the Soviet Union proper.

The trouble is, of course, that the Near Abroad is turning West: a movement that began with the toppling of Milosevic in Serbia (never part of the USSR, but a natural Russian ally for reasons of shared heritage) last year spread to Georgia, and now to Ukraine. This last was too much to bear, not least because of the large population of ethnic Russians within Ukraine. And, of course, a bustling democracy on Russia's western frontier could only make Putin's heavy-handed governance appear just that much more onerous for his longsuffering countrymen.

So much for the preliminaries; now on to Tom's questions and comments.

I not sure anyone has given must thought to the implication of a Ukraine in the Western rather then traditional Russian sphere of influence.

True enough, the blogosphere has fastened onto the idea of bloodless revolution—something that has happened precious few times in history, and rare enough to be celebrated. But that does not mean that the implications for Russia have been ignored. Not that I can point out chapter and verse, mind you: I'm rather behind on my blogreading of late. Winds of Change is pretty much the go-to place for strategic analysis, and I'd be surprised indeed if they did not have a piece or several there, or at the very least links to detailed discussions elsewhere.

Will the disintegration of the Soviet Union be followed by a disintegration of the Russian Federation if pro-Western factions prevail?

First let's consider the immediate future for Ukraine. Yushchenko will win the revote; for the present government and its candidate everything is all over but the crying. And due to uncharacteristic ham-handedness on Putin's part after the first, flawed vote, there is now nothing that Russia can do to prevent this outcome: at least not without incurring universal loss of goodwill, which the country can ill afford. (See this piece by Richard Holbrooke in the WaPo for more.) There may be some violence, and parts of eastern Ukraine will make noises about secession. But that will likely pass.

Will disgruntled provinces within Russia itself see the events in Ukraine as inspiration to break free themselves? Maybe: but remember that Chechnya has tried already, and we all know just how well that turned out. The Russian Federation may eventually break down into various parts separated by religion and ethnicity—that has, after all, been the pattern of the past decade in southeastern Europe and the Caucasus—but popular independence movements are not likely to arise unless and until the central government is considerably weakened.

Should the West be concerned with or give any accommodation to the Russian sphere of influence in surrounding countries as a component of it’s real or perceived security needs?

Yes, certainly. Unless Putin or a successor turn out to be more totalitarian than authoritarian, Russia should be a strategic partner. I'm no fan of engagement for engagement's sake—it hasn't worked out very well for the United States' attempts at influencing China, or for the EU's pathetic display of “soft power” in negotiating with Iran. But pursuing Russian favor is nonetheless a better option than either confrontration or benign neglect.

The next question of course becomes how to so accommodate Russian interests. Frankly, I've no idea, especially as Ukraine's Orange Revolution will likely not be the last time that our desire to spread democracy and respect for human rights will conflict with Russia's need to preserve stability.

How will Russia react to their obsession for secure and defensible borders for Russia would find its first line of defense along nearly the lines of Nazi's Germany’s deepest penetration into the country in World War II?

Initially, not very well, as Putin's increasing surliness attests. Calls for Ukrainian NATO membership are not likely to ease tensions. But despite grumblings, Russians are beginning to grow accustomed to the idea of NATO enlargement—especially since Afghanistan and Iraq have proven that the force projection capabilities of most member states are essentially nil. The alliance can hardly be considered even a potential threat to the Russian motherland, and clearly is not a present one.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but without Ukraine, are Russia's political, economic and military survivability are called into question?

This isn't a zero-sum game. Ukraine with a pro-Moscow tilt would have continued as a buffer between Russia and an expanding European Union; but as Ukraine instead looks West it will not forget the East. On the contrary: within the next decade a growing Ukrainian economy can prove to be a great boon to western Russia. Unless, as discussed above, Russia perceives a new and thriving democracy on its doorstep as a threat to internal stability. In such case all attempts at engagement, by the United States or the rest of the West, would likely prove fruitless.

I do not expect that last scenario to materialize; Putin is not that short-sighted. Even so, the long term prospects for Russia are not good. If demographics is destiny then the die is cast: by the end of this century Europe will be Islamic and Russia will be desolate. A country in which for decades abortions have outnumbered live births has already chosen extinction.

Anthony,

Thanks for the response. Your humble tone does not obscure the fact that you have a complete grasp of the situation and presented it in a polished expression, perhaps you should apply for a position on the SecState’s staff. I would like to take the opportunity afforded by this venue to put some more color to my concerns and then take a crack at answering my own questions. Please forgive in advance any grammatical errors, trying to do my real job as I post a response.

I agree with your assertion that Putin’s future is secure (for the moment) even the Ukraine is not the only place where Putin has been forced to consume geopolitical crow of late; Russian geopolitical defeats in the past four years have come in at blistering pace. Moscow racked up foreign policy losses in Central Asia, the Baltics, the Balkans and the Caucasus. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan all became U.S. allies. Serbia formally left Russia's sphere of influence (as you noted), Georgia welcomed U.S. troops with open arms and ejected a Russian-backed strongman from one of its separatist republics, and the three Baltic states and the bulk of the Warsaw Pact joined both NATO and the European Union. The fact is that he now lacks the political levers to reverse any of these events.

His efforts to get the Bush administration to label the Chechens as terrorists were successful but this is pyrrhic victory for the cover it provided did little to improve the situation on the ground. Chechnya is still a blight on Putin’s credibility and may ultimately become a liability if the military situation changes. The Russians are in no better position today then they were at the outset of the conflict to end the stalemate militarily, 90,000 troops unable to pacify Chechnya even after five years of direct occupation.

In the background, both the European Union and NATO have accelerated the deterioration of the Russian geopolitical situation. They have expanded their borders steadily and now standby to welcome the Ukraine with open arms while Russia stands by their voice unheard in the rush. While I agree with your point (made in answer to one of the questions) about the military viability of NATO apart from the United States:

Patrick Belton at Oxblog has a long post on the issues surrounding NATO's non-US power projection limitations. The US wants the alliance to face problems outside of Europe, notably in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East. But it is largely locked in place, a hostage to Continental politics and a lack of means.

the basic problem of the alliance ... is cash. While the US contributes 3.3% of its GDP to national defence, 12 of the 19 pre-2004 NATO allies contribute less than 2% of theirs. To look at it another way, the US picks up the tab for 64% of NATO military expenditures ($348.5 million, 2002), while all other allies together contribute only 36% ($196.0 million). For their part, European governments are facing budget shortfalls and budget pressure from ballooning pension costs.

What comes out of this is a capabilities gap. Of 1.4 million soldiers under NATO arms in October 2003, allies other than the US contributed all of 55,000. Nearly all allies lack forces which can be projected away from the European theatre. SACEUR General James Jones testified before Congress in March 2004 that only 3-4% of European forces were deployable for expeditions.

It represents a constant reminder of the failures of Realpolitiks practices of the Russian state. It is another in a series of setbacks to Russian prestige for which I believe Putin will ultimately paid the cost. I like your statement that “Vladimir Putin is Russia” and I agree that he provides the Russians populists with façade of strong traditional leadership. But is not the public that I would concern myself with in the near future. I am convinced that the Russian military is close to their “tipping point” with respect the aforementioned geopolitical, in their minds strategic posture.

While I am not predicting a coup d'etat, I could easily see the Russian military demand a stronger line from Putin while began to work more actively to undermine him. The effect would in the end put him an antagonistic role with the West. Simultaneously they would covertly work against American (who they rightly or wrongly perceive as the symbol of Western power) interests with or without Putin’s sanction.

Back to the Ukriane I personally think that all of these setbacks pale, in comparison to the situation there, Russia's ancestral home. The 10th- to 13th-century entity of Kievian Rus is widely considered to the birthplace of today's Russia. But Moscow's queasiness over losing Ukraine is far from merely the anxiety of emotional attachment. Here are some facts* to consider

- All but one of Russia's major infrastructure links to Europe pass through Ukraine.

- Three-quarters of Russia's natural gas exports pass through Soviet-era pipelines that cross Ukraine.

- In most years, Russia has imported food from Ukraine.

- Eastern Ukraine is geographically part of the Russian industrial heartland.

- The Dnieper River, the key transport route in Russia's Belarusian ally, flows south through Ukraine -- not east Russia.

- With a population of just under 50 million, Ukraine is the only captive market in the Russian orbit worth reintegrating with.

- The Black Sea fleet -- Russia's only true warm-water fleet -- remains at Sevastopol on Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula because it is the only deep-water port on the entire former Soviet Black Sea coast.

- A glance at a population density map indicates just how close Russia's population centers are to the Ukrainian border, and how a hostile Ukraine would pinch off easy Russian access to the volatile North Caucasus, a region already rife with separatist tendencies.

- Moscow and Volgograd -- Russia's two defiant icons of World War II -- are both less than 300 miles from the Ukrainian border.

* From my basic Stratfor membership

Taken together I believe that represent a critical moment in Russian history. To say Russia is at a turning point is a gross understatement. Without Ukraine, I believe that Russia is doomed to a painful slide into geopolitical obsolescence and ultimately, perhaps even nonexistence.

Here are my responses to the questions I poised:

I not sure anyone has given must thought to the implication of a Ukraine in the Western rather then traditional Russian sphere of influence.

I agree with you here and perhaps my categorical statement about the lack of thinking on the matter was somewhat overstated. I suspect that mainstream media outlets find the topic of the events in the Ukraine to be more of a feel good story about the power of the proletariat then an opportunity for in-depth analyses of the Russian perspective.

Will the disintegration of the Soviet Union be followed by a disintegration of the Russian Federation if pro-Western factions prevail?

The Commonwealth of Independent States, the only international organization that Moscow can rely upon to support it (and, incidentally, the only one it dominates) is moribund because of lack of interest. Its days are numbered. Talk of a Russian-led Eurasian Economic Community that would reform the Soviet economy remains largely talk. Even in participation in the French dream of a “Multipolar Alliance” is one where Russia would have little to contribute.

I don’t not agree however with your perspective about the Ukrainian model being a disincentive for other ethic people groups, I would make the point that Russia is largely a state formed by an expansionary military policy. The Karelian Isthmus of Russia's northwest once was Finnish territory, while the southern tier of the Russian Far East was once Chinese. Deep within the Russian "motherland" are the homelands of vibrant minorities such as the Tatars and the Bashkirs, who theoretically could survive on their own. Of course the North Caucasus is a region ripe for shattering; Chechens are not the only Muslims in the region with separatist desires. 

I am making the case that Ukraine leaving the Russian sphere of influence that will create the condition where “…popular independence movements are not likely to arise unless and until the central government is considerably weakened.

Should the West be concerned with or give any accommodation to the Russian sphere of influence in surrounding countries as a component of it’s real or perceived security needs?

To me this is the hardest question for which I cannot find an acceptable answer. As is probably discernable to the reader by now I am generally not an optimist on the matter of Russia. I do not believe that the West has any meaningfully positive influence in the long run. I am convinced that the West will have to re-adopt a model of containment for a more authoritarian and increasingly unfriendly Russia. I don’t think that we can offer anything more then symbolic gestures that I believe in the end will not satisfy Russian nationalist elements.

How will Russia react to their obsession for secure and defensible borders for Russia would find its first line of defense along nearly the lines of Nazi's Germany’s deepest penetration into the country in World War II?

There is an assumption that he is eager to avoid a confrontation with the West, which is certainly true. As you stated he threw his support to President Bush during the election by making a number of supporting comments. I believe he expects to be repaid. If the Bush administration presses hard on Ukraine or has nothing to offer as a counterbalance (again I submit there is nothing to give), I suspect this will be the trigger of a fundamental re-evaluation by Russia of its strategy.

I am convinced that if Putin is to make the West rethink its current intention and safeguard his own position, he will have to act in a way to remind the West that Moscow still has fight left in it and is far from out of options. They may be the options akin to a player with a losing poker hand, but options none-the-less. Here are some immediate “feedback” that he could give the West:

Consider the situation in Iraq if the latest generation of Russian technology in anti-tank and man portable air defense weapons were made available to the insurgency. While they would not provide a long term tactical advantage that American forces could not overcome, the potential for greater lethality leading to an exponential increase in casualties and thus creating a perturbation in the politics of Iraq.

Consider the possibility of Russian sales of long-range cruise missiles in India or Sovremenny destroyers complete with Sunburn missiles to China would threaten U.S. control of the oceans. Weapons sales to Latin America would undermine U.S. influence in its own backyard. The occasional quiet message to North Korea could menace all U.S. policy in the Koreas.Any scenario that stretches American military power, particularly the posture of the Army and the logistical components (of all services) would send the message.

The question is how would the message be received? I must admit that all of these potential have side effects, not the least of which is to irritate the President of the United States. Putin must understand is that Bush will reward friends. Bush's test of friendship is simple: support for the United States and, in particular, support for his policies (by default those policies being pursued in the war on terror) will be rewarded and those would do not will pay for it. A decision by Putin to oppose the United States will did so with the assumption that could absorb the cost or that the end is near and the cost does not matter.

Unfortunately everyone at the table, to continue the Poker analogy, knows the Russian wearing the funny glasses on, and a perpetually full glass of Vodka on the rocks, halfway through his last cigarette, is short stacked. The last hand is being played and the last bet has been called. In Putin’s case he is looking at deuces, off suite and the President is slow playing him with an inside straight. Game over.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but without Ukraine, are Russia's political, economic and military survivability are called into question?

Because I believe that “Vladimir Putin is Russia” I must disagree that it “isn’t a zero-sum game”, I believe it is. I am convinced that we are seeing the beginnings of the end of Russian as we now it. It is an “earthquake society” (thanks again to Stratfor). It does not evolve. The pressures, social, political and economic build up within the country until it suffers a massive tectonic shift, cataclysmic breakdown and then revival. To my mind the only question remaining is how much time do these last hands take?

Thanks for reading, interested in your thoughts in response... I will now drink what is left of my "cup half empty" beverage and continue reading the rest of your excellent blog.

Sincerely

TomBombadil