For graduate students, the temptation to inflate the importance of one's dissertation topic is an ever-present one. Even those whose grip on wider reality remains strong want desperately to believe that their work is, at the least, somewhat interesting for those outside their particular sub-subspecialty. It's a defense mechanism, the strength of which increases exponentially with the time spent in postgraduate education.
And believe me when I say that I would know.
Yet that hardly means that I am immune to the effect. On the contrary: for this post is the first in what will become an occasional series on my thesis research.
This is because I have objective reason to believe that the topic will be of interest to many readers of this site—because said topic is what is commonly called Intelligent Design Theory.
Here's the short version of my conclusion.
As a philosophical program, intelligent design is at best highly problematic. Moreover, hopes for a design-based scientific research problem are little more than wishful thinking. The many conservatives who see in the intelligent design project a means of religious or cultural resurgence are betting on a losing horse.
Fighting words? Oh, yes. So let me clear up some potential misunderstandings at the outset. I remain both a Christian, and a conservative. And I do have a certain sympathy for the apologetic aims of the ID movement. But I am also a philosopher of science, and cannot stand idly by as my co-religionists and other fellow travellers promote what I have (somewhat reluctantly) concluded is a gross error.
Below is the Overview from my dissertation proposal, which I will be defending this Friday. If either you or your curiousity are piqued, do check back often, as I will be unpacking my reasoning in a series of essays beginning this summer.
_______________________________
In the past decade there has been renewed enthusiasm among some philosophically-minded theists for variations of the classic design argument. Advocates of this program generally focus on two subjects: differing forms of the cosmological anthropic principle, and the case for explicit divine action in the history of life. Although these topics may be pursued for similar apologetic ends, the modes of argument tend to be very different. Stronger versions of the anthropic principle reduce to the claim that fine-tuning of physical constants demonstrates that the universe was, at the least, intelligently conceived. However, proponents of what are now commonly called “intelligent design'' (ID) arguments make more sweeping claims about the necessity for extra-natural involvement in the development of life, either as an adjunct to, or a replacement for, naturalistic large-scale evolution. As such, the ID position should be carefully distinguished from the forms of theistic evolution that are broadly compatible with evolutionary theory as scientifically understood.
read the rest »
The main focus of this proposed work will be to analyze the arguments of ID theory as given by the movement's leading philosophical and scientific advocates. In order to ground this investigation in a broader context, however, I will begin with a historical summary of the role played by design arguments in eighteenth and nineteenth century British natural theology. This overview will be valuable both for placing the neo-Paleyian arguments of ID theorists within a longstanding tradition, and later for examining theological alternatives not having such a pronounced adversarial relationship with modern biology.
If, as Ruse (1999) argues, the history of science shows a clear trend towards adoption of epistemic values and rejection of more obviously culture-laden ones, it is not surprising that theological speculation is absent from contemporary professional science. Indeed, naturalism as an operational principle is taken for granted by practicing scientists. Yet ID theorists unanimously maintain that such methodological naturalism—in essence the axiom that natural science is only equipped to investigate natural causes—unjustifiably eliminates potentially correct explanations which posit divine action. Some of these arguments possess more rhetorical bark than conceptual bite. A few, however, such as those of Plantinga (1991a, b; 1997) are worthy of closer scrutiny, especially in light of assertions from the opposite ideological camp that methodological naturalism does after all logically entail stronger metaphysical claims. The second chapter of this proposed work will therefore examine the question of naturalism in some detail.
Nearly all technical work by ID theorists is structured around the concept of complexity, which is posited as an intrinsic property of biological systems. There are two distinct, but mutually supportive, strategies. Behe (1996; 2002) argues from the standpoint of molecular biology, and claims that in a nontrivial number of cases the inherent complexity of molecular machines is irreducible: the system is comprised of several interacting parts, each contributing to its functional integrity; the removal of one such part renders the system inoperative. Because each component is effectively primitive—there are no biologically active subparts of molecules—and because natural selection cannot act upon nonfunctional systems, Darwinian processes cannot be invoked to explain the stepwise evolution of such machines. Dembski's (1998; 2002) favored form of complexity is specified. Roughly speaking, he means complexity conforming to a pattern (or “specification'') which is itself not dependent upon the phenomenon it is employed to describe; under such circumstances design may be a valid inference. The particulars of Dembski's argument are couched in the language of probability and information theory and require close scrutiny, especially as his use of concepts from these disciplines is at times nonstandard.
My appraisal is that both of these strategies are seriously flawed. The third chapter of this proposed work will examine why and explore whether anything of epistemic significance can be gleaned from the ID program, focusing in particular on aspects relating to information theory and scientific explanation.
As discussed above, ID theorists postulate that explicit divine action has been integral to the history of life. This commitment is in itself nothing new; what distinguishes ID from its forebears is the additional claim that the signature of design is both detectable and quantifiable, and hence is a legitimate subject for scientific inquiry in spite of its extra-natural origin. But one striking aspect of this doctrine is an imposed limit on allowed divine action: the possibility that God might have front-loaded all necessary design into the laws of nature, thus rendering redundant further action beyond the purview of those laws, is excluded. The motive for such explicit rejection is a continuing antipathy towards biological evolution—not just the neo-Darwinian theory, but also what are perceived as the philosophical, cultural, and theological corollaries of that theory.
Hence the debate over naturalism. It is not, however, sufficient to charge that ID is a mere repackaging of naive creationism: most prominent advocates are not biblical literalists, and indeed a few are cultural, rather than religious, conservatives. Yet the vehement opposition to evolutionary biology is ultimately indefensible, even though many of the commitments underlying this opposition have long histories and should not be easily dismissed. As a conclusion to this proposed work, it will be useful to assess whether these commitments may be judged tenable independent of claims regarding the scope of evolutionary processes: for if so, then ID theory, apart from being epistemically questionable, is in the end also superfluous.
« truncated view
your e-mail address will not be displayed.